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Note
ANALOG SOLUTIONS: E-DISCOVERY
SPOLIATION SANCTIONS AND THE
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO FRCP 37(E)
SCOTT M. O’BRIEN†
ABSTRACT
The ever-increasing importance of digital technology in today’s
commercial environment has created several serious problems for
courts operating under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’s
(FRCP) discovery regime. As the volume of discoverable information
has grown exponentially, so too have the opportunities for abuse and
misinterpretation of the FRCP’s outdated e-discovery rules. Federal
courts are divided over the criteria for imposing the most severe
discovery sanctions as well as the practical ramifications of the
preservation duty as applied to electronically stored information. As a
result, litigants routinely feel pressured to overpreserve potentially
discoverable data, often at great expense.
At a conference at the Duke University School of Law in 2010,
experts from all sides of the civil-litigation system concluded that the
e-discovery rules were in desperate need of updating. The subsequent
four years saw a flurry of rulemaking efforts. In 2014, a package of
proposed FRCP amendments included a complete overhaul of Rule
37(e), the provision governing spoliation sanctions for electronically
stored information. This Note analyzes the proposed Rule and argues
that the amendment will fail to accomplish the Advisory Committee’s
goals because it focuses too heavily on preserving the trial court’s
discretion in imposing sanctions and focuses too little on incentivizing
efficient and cooperative pretrial discovery. The Note concludes by
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offering revisions and enforcement mechanisms that would allow the
new Rule 37(e) to better address the e-discovery issues identified at the
Duke Conference.

INTRODUCTION
In 2003, the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight
(OFHEO) opened an investigation into the accounting and financial
practices of the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie
1
Mae). The preliminary investigation report, which found that Fannie
Mae “had departed from generally accepted accounting principles in
order to manipulate its reported earnings and inflate executive
compensation,” prompted several private civil suits that became a
single multidistrict litigation in the United States District Court for
2
the District of Columbia. Parties to the civil suit served the OFHEO
with a third-party subpoena to produce more than thirty categories of
documents related to the investigation and the OFHEO agreed to
provide the electronically stored information (ESI) voluntarily,
3
apparently not comprehending the true volume of data requested.
The OFHEO missed multiple production deadlines and the district
court ultimately held the agency in contempt, despite the fact that the
OFHEO had spent approximately $6 million—more than 9 percent of
4
the agency’s annual budget—responding to the request. The D.C.
Circuit affirmed, holding that “[t]he sanction was a proper exercise of
the district court’s contempt power because it coerced compliance
with the stipulated order and compensated the individual defendants
5
for the delay they suffered.” After dedicating nearly a tenth of its
total budget to a single production request, the court forced the
OFHEO to produce all responsive documents—including those
6
withheld for privilege—at its own cost.
In modern civil litigation, the OFHEO’s experience is hardly an
7
outlier. The central role of computers and electronic storage systems
in today’s business environment (and society at large) has driven

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

In re Fannie Mae Sec. Litig., 552 F.3d 814, 816 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
Id.
Id. at 817.
Id. at 817–18.
Id. at 823.
Id. at 818.
See infra notes 55–59 and accompanying text.
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8

exponential growth in the volume of ESI, which in turn has increased
9
costs and delays in the pretrial discovery process. One major
company estimated that costs related to ESI production in a
10
“midsize” case can range from $2.5 million to $3.5 million. The
costly nature of production, sometimes a result of abuse of the
procedural rules for discovery, has often spurred amendments to the
11
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. These issues came to the forefront
once again in May 2010 when the Civil Rules Advisory Committee
(the Advisory Committee or Committee) held a conference at the
Duke University School of Law (the Duke Conference or
Conference) to address “the issues of cost and delay in the federal
12
civil-litigation system.” Participants voiced concerns that “the system
can be abused so that the goals of Rule 1 are not achieved . . . [and]
discovery can be used for impermissible purposes such as increasing
13
the burdens of litigation to gain an unjustified advantage . . . .”
Pursuant to the Duke Conference’s recommendations, the Advisory
Committee proposed a package of amendments that included a
14
wholesale revision of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e) barely a
15
decade into that rule’s existence. Initial versions of the amendments
8. See John H. Beisner, Discovering a Better Way: The Need for Effective Civil Litigation
Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 564 (2010) (noting that “99 percent of the world’s information is now
generated electronically”).
9. For an empirical study of ESI-related disputes and sanctions motions, see generally
Dan H. Willoughby, Rose Hunter Jones & Gregory R. Antine, Sanctions for E-Discovery
Violations: By the Numbers, 60 DUKE L.J. 789, 790–91 (2010) (noting an empirical study found
that there was a significant increase in sanctions motions and awards in cases involving ediscovery between 2004 and 2010 and claiming that ESI-related sanctions “are at an all-time
high”).
10. See infra notes 60–61 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., William H. Erickson, The Pound Conference Recommendations: A Blueprint
for the Justice System in the Twenty-First Century, 76 F.R.D. 277, 288 (1978) (“There is a very
real concern in the legal community that the discovery process is now being overused. Wild
fishing expeditions . . . seem to be the norm.”).
12. John G. Koeltl, Progress in the Spirit of Rule 1, 60 DUKE L.J. 537, 538 (2010).
13. Id. Rule 1 states that the purpose of the FRCP is “to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.” FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
14. Rule 37(e) was initially adopted as Rule 37(f) but redesignated as Rule 37(e) without
change in 2007. FED. R. CIV. P. 37 advisory committee’s note to 2007 amendment.
15. The amendments package was approved by the Supreme Court in April 2015 and is
under congressional review. If approved by Congress, the amendments will go into effect on
December 1, 2015. See Ross M. Gotler, Supreme Court Adopts Amendments to Federal Rules,
Many Impacting E-Discovery Practice, to Become Law on December 1, 2015, LEXOLOGY (Apr.
30, 2015), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=5b631e63-87f2-4020-a4ba-8aec9ed89
e51 [http://perma.cc/X4V5-Y3FG] (“Unless Congress acts to the contrary, the amendments will
become law on December 1, 2015.”). Up-to-date information as to the status of the amendments
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were sweeping in scope and focus, but subsequent changes have
unfortunately stripped some of the proposals’ most promising
elements in the name of preserving trial courts’ discretion in the
sanctions process.
The current version of Rule 37(e), adopted in 2006, provides a
safe harbor from sanctions for the innocent loss of ESI resulting from
16
the standard operation of data-storage systems. The rule itself is
deceptively concise: “Absent exceptional circumstances, a court may
not impose sanctions under these rules on a party for failing to
provide electronically stored information lost as a result of the
17
routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information system.”
The Advisory Committee hoped Rule 37(e) would protect parties
from sanctions for “the routine alteration and deletion of information
18
that attends ordinary use [of computer systems].” Instead, federal
courts have developed a variety of standards for ESI-spoliation
19
sanctions. As a result, many potential litigants feel pressure to
engage in “massive and costly over-preservation” to mitigate the risk
20
of judicial sanctions when litigation does arise. Overpreservation
was one of several ESI-related problems that prompted the Duke
Conference to conclude that the existing Rule 37(e) “has not proved
21
to be much of a safe harbor.”
In the four years since the Duke Conference, the Advisory
Committee has held numerous hearings and promulgated multiple
amendment proposals for public comment. The current rules
package, approved by the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee
on Civil Rules (the Judicial Conference) and submitted to the
Congress for review in April 2015, contains an amendment to Rule

package can be found on the U.S. Courts’ website. See Pending Rules Amendments, U.S.
COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/pending-rules-amendments [http://perma.cc/
4HYD-MA2B] (listing rules currently pending review).
16. See 8B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, MARY KAY KANE, RICHARD
L. MARCUS & ADAM N. STEINMAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2284.1 (3d ed. 2014)
(discussing courts’ limits on imposing sanctions under 37(e)).
17. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e).
18. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment.
19. See infra Part I.B.1.
20. ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, U.S. COURTS, ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE – APRIL 2014, at 370 [hereinafter 2014 AGENDA BOOK],
http://www.uscourts.gov/file/15486/download [http://perma.cc/HB83-TFDC].
21. Memorandum from Gregory P. Joseph to the Honorable John G. Koeltl 2 (May 11,
2010) [hereinafter 2010 E-Discovery Panel Memorandum], http://www.uscourts.gov/file/
document/e-discovery-panel-executive-summary [http://perma.cc/PU5V-ZCQS].
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37(e) that would entirely replace the existing rule and, according to
the Advisory Committee, provide more detailed guidance regarding
22
permissible remedies for lost ESI. The proposed amendment
requires courts to find “intent to deprive another party of the
23
[electronically stored] information’s use” before imposing severe
24
sanctions of dismissal or an adverse inference. Absent such a finding,
courts “may order measures no greater than necessary to cure the
25
prejudice” resulting from the lost ESI.
This Note analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of the proposed
Rule 37(e) and argues that the amendment fails to address the
perceived discovery issues because it focuses too heavily on
preserving the trial court’s discretion in imposing sanctions and too
little on incentivizing efficient and cooperative pretrial discovery. In
its current state, the rules package is a missed opportunity that
apparently results from a problematic misperception of what actually
drives costly litigation. As this Note argues, the amendment package
would benefit from greater attention to the role of interparty conduct
and cooperation in preventing excessive cost and delay. The parties
themselves have the best knowledge of both their claims and their
internal electronic storage systems, meaning they are uniquely
situated to develop workable and efficient ESI obligations early in the
course of a case. Furthermore, a stringent judicial standard for
imposing severe sanctions could create perverse incentives for parties
in crafting internal preservation protocols. Thus, the Advisory
Committee’s goals would be better served by revising the proposals to
clearly explain the ESI preservation obligation and better incentivize
cooperative resolution of e-discovery disputes during, and perhaps
26
prior to, litigation. Even if the proposed amendments take effect as
they currently stand, courts would benefit from limiting emphasis on
bad-faith intent in ESI destruction and focusing instead on
encouraging parties to cooperatively develop comprehensive case27
management plans with the help of data-system experts.

22. Memorandum from Judge David G. Campbell to Judge Jeffrey Sutton, at Rules App.
B-14 (June 14, 2014) [hereinafter 2014 Rules Memorandum], http://www.uscourts.gov/file/
18218/download [http://perma.cc/54K4-6CUQ].
23. Id. at Rules App. B-57.
24. An adverse inference either permits or requires the jury to assume the missing data was
damaging to the party that lost it.
25. Id.
26. See infra Part III.B.1.
27. See infra Part III.B.2.
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The Note proceeds in three parts. Part I provides an overview of
e-discovery procedure and spoliation law under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure (FRCP), including the issues that led to the
development of both Rule 37(e) and the current package of proposed
amendments. Part II examines in detail the four proposals
promulgated since the Duke Conference, including the amendments
currently under congressional review. Finally, Part III analyzes the
merits of the proposed amendment and argues for revisions,
enforcement methods, and alternative approaches that will help give
effect to the Advisory Committee’s stated goals.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE FRCP DISCOVERY RULES AND
RULE 37(E)
District Judge Lee Rosenthal, a former chair of the Advisory
Committee on the Federal Rules of Procedure, provides an apt
characterization of the history of the FRCP discovery rules: “Since
their inception in 1938, the rules of discovery have been revised with
what some view as distressing frequency. And yet the rulemakers
continue to hear that the rules are inadequate to control discovery
28
costs and burdens.” Indeed, Rules 26 through 37 have experienced a
number of revisions since 1938, often in response to the perception
that discovery abuses were preventing the Rules from accomplishing
their stated purpose of “secur[ing] the just, speedy, and inexpensive
29
determination of every action and proceeding.”
30
Like previous reform movements, the current amendments
reflect the general feeling that “the system can be abused so that the
31
goals of Rule 1 are not achieved.” Although the symptoms identified
at the Duke Conference are relatively new, the diagnosis and
treatment are not: the civil-litigation system is inefficient and flawed,
32
and the rules of procedure must change accordingly. The discovery

28. Lee H. Rosenthal, From Rules of Procedure to How Lawyers Litigate: ‘Twixt the Cup
and the Lip, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 227, 228 (2010).
29. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
30. See, e.g., supra note 11 and accompanying text.
31. Koeltl, supra note 12, at 538 (“[D]iscovery can be used for impermissible purposes such
as increasing the burdens of litigation to gain an unjustified advantage for the plaintiffs or
defendants.”).
32. Id. at 544 (noting that Conference participants identified e-discovery as a particularly
problematic source of litigation costs and “reached a consensus that a rule addressing
preservation (spoliation) would be a valuable addition to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure”).
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rules’ history shows that both the current and proposed versions of
Rule 37(e) largely emphasize the role of the judiciary and the Rules
themselves in addressing issues of cost, delay, and abuse.
This Part provides the background necessary to understand the
discovery rules’ structure and the role of Rule 37(e). Section A
discusses the history of the rules governing discovery procedure and
the development of the original version of Rule 37(e). Section B
examines (1) Rule 37(e)’s application in the context of spoliation case
law and (2) the issues identified at the Duke Conference that led to
the current amendment process.
A. History of the FRCP Discovery Rules
1. 1938–2006. Prior to the adoption of the FRCP in 1938, pretrial
33
discovery at common law was “extremely limited.” Professor
Stephen Subrin characterizes the early common-law litigation process
“not as a rational quest for truth, but rather a method by which
34
society could determine which side God took to be truthful or just.”
The discovery rules of the time support his interpretation. Litigants
could not submit interrogatories or depose anyone besides the
opposing party (even then only in the presence of the judge), and
parties could not even reach discovery without “independently
35
stat[ing] facts to substantiate the claims set forth in the complaint.”
Courts were vehemently opposed to the proverbial “fishing
expedition[]” and, in general, “discovery opportunities were spotty
36
and incomplete.”
In crafting a set of rules that commentators have come to view as
37
a discovery revolution, the FRCP drafters intended to create a
system through which parties could “obtain the fullest possible
38
knowledge of the issues and facts before trial.” Under the FRCP,
parties enjoy “broader discovery rights than any state or federal

33. Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of the
1938 Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 694 (1998).
34. Id. at 695.
35. Beisner, supra note 8, at 554–55.
36. Richard L. Marcus, Retooling American Discovery for the Twenty-First Century:
Toward a New World Order?, 7 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 153, 159 (1999).
37. Beisner, supra note 8, at 558 (“[T]he drafters of the 1938 Federal Rules radically
expanded both the scope of permissible discovery and the tools parties could use to obtain it”
thus going “‘further than any single jurisdiction’s discovery provisions.’”).
38. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947).
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jurisdiction” offered under the pre-1938 common law. This radical
expansion of the discovery process reflected the drafters’ belief that
liberal pretrial discovery would be more cost-effective and efficient
because parties would focus discovery efforts on the issues and claims
40
the opposition actually planned to litigate.
In the decades following 1938, the Advisory Committee
broadened the discovery rules with a series of amendments until
“[p]arty-controlled discovery reached its high-water mark in the 1970
41
amendments.” Among other revisions, the 1970 amendments
removed the judicial-permission requirement for most depositions
42
and explicitly authorized the unlimited use of discovery methods.
Unsurprisingly, parties availed themselves of these broad rights to an
43
extent that commentators came to view as abusive, and in 1983 the
pendulum swung back toward active judicial case management with a
series of reforms that the Advisory Committee chairman and drafter
of the amendments called a “180-degree shift” in discovery
44
procedure. The 1983 amendments, strengthened by further changes
45
46
in 1993 and 2000, required judges to more actively control the
47
process by holding discovery conferences and limiting burdensome
48
production requests in proportion to the desired information’s
49
importance. As the substance of these amendments suggests, the

39. Rosenthal, supra note 28, at 232.
40. See Beisner, supra note 8, at 556–57 (“[T]he drafters concluded that . . . [m]utual selfinterest, coupled with a desire to avoid wasting clients’ time and money, would minimize
discovery disputes and lead to the expeditious exchange of relevant information.”).
41. Richard L. Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 39 B.C. L. REV. 747, 749 (1998).
42. Rosenthal, supra note 28, at 233.
43. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
44. ARTHUR R. MILLER, FED. JUD. CTR., THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND
LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY 33 (1984).
45. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment (adding, inter
alia, paragraphs (1)–(4) of subdivision (a)).
46. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment (implementing,
inter alia, national uniformity in disclosure practices).
47. FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment.
48. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) advisory committee’s note to 1983
amendment.
49. See Rosenthal, supra note 28, at 235 (“The combination of discovery conferences and
the direction to curtail disproportionate discovery required judges to undertake some
managerial action in most cases and encouraged judicial involvement even when not
required.”).
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Advisory Committee felt that district judges were best positioned to
rein in abusive discovery practices.
Overall, the history of the FRCP discovery rules reveals the
consistent theme that, from the drafters’ perspective, adjusting the
degree of judicial oversight most effectively addresses inefficient and
wasteful pretrial discovery conduct. As scholars have noted, however,
the record of these amendments in practice shows that this approach
50
is often largely ineffective. The 2006 amendment that produced the
51
current Rule 37(e), which was never circulated for public comment,
reflects a continuation of this attitude toward procedural reform.
2. The 2006 E-Discovery Amendments. Before examining the
history of Rule 37(e) in practice, it is helpful first to understand the
factors that led to the creation of ESI-specific discovery rules in 2006.
This Subsection lays out the issues identified by the Advisory
Committee in dealing with ESI and the Committee's stated goals
during the development of the Rule 37(e) safe harbor.
a. The Unique Challenges of ESI. Rule 37(e) became part of the
FRCP in 2006 through a package of amendments intended to address
the unique issues presented by ESI’s prevalence in modern civil
52
litigation. As computer systems became central to business
operations toward the end of the twentieth century, judges struggled
to apply the discovery rules developed prior to the computer
53
revolution. Some courts initially treated ESI exactly the same as
paper documents—that is, by allowing liberal electronic discovery—
but critics of this approach observed that “a literal, unyielding
approach to electronic data can be devastatingly expensive” in ways

50. See, e.g., Beisner, supra note 8, at 563 (“These reforms, though well intentioned, failed
to stem the delay and excessive costs that have become the hallmarks of pretrial discovery.”);
Rosenthal, supra note 28, at 236 (“Although the debate over the change in the scope of
discovery [in 2000] was passionate, it too was perceived as having little effect on practice.”).
51. Gregory P. Joseph, Electronic Discovery and Other Problems 4 (2010) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
52. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 16, § 2284.1 (“Rule 37(e) [was] adopted as Rule 37(f) in
the 2006 package of amendments to deal with discovery of electronically stored information.”).
53. See Jonathan M. Redgrave & Ted S. Hiser, The Information Age, Part I: Fishing in the
Ocean, A Critical Examination of Discovery in the Electronic Age, 2 SEDONA CONF. J. 195, 203–
05 (2001) (“The trend in case law seems to indicate that as courts become more familiar with
electronic data discovery, there is a corresponding increase in the propensity to grant liberal
discovery into computer systems and files.”).
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that the production of physical documents could never be. It became
clear that the digital age had brought with it “a staggering volume of
potentially discoverable information,” and existing discovery rules did
55
not provide effective guidance for courts and parties.
The Duke Conference’s findings provide a comprehensive
summary of the unique discovery issues implicated by ESI. Though
the Duke Conference featured discussion of a wide variety of
procedural topics, ESI preservation and production were primary
emphases due to concerns that abusive e-discovery practice was the
true culprit in creating excessive litigation costs and delays. Indeed, if
Duke Conference participants agreed on one point, it was that the
unprecedented volume of ESI has substantially changed the nature of
56
discovery in civil litigation.
At the Duke Conference, contributors identified several
attributes of ESI that tend to increase the cost of conducting
discovery in the digital age. The advent of electronic data systems has
generally made recordkeeping more efficient and cost-effective for
businesses; for a variety of reasons, however, ESI can result in greater
costs than physical documents in the litigation context. The most
obvious reason is volume: when companies can store terabytes of data
on hard drives, backup tapes, and cloud storage systems, the pool of
57
potentially discoverable documents grows exponentially. Reviewing
such voluminous records for responsiveness poses serious challenges.
Litigants must first load the ESI onto special databases where
attorneys can code and filter individual documents for relevance, a
process that often entails costly restoration of older data from backup

54. Id. at 206; see also id. at 207 (“Litigation concerns should not dictate the purpose of
business communication and data storage systems or else we will have truly allowed the tail to
wag the dog.”).
55. Emily Burns, Michelle Greer Galloway & Jeffrey Gross, E-Discovery: One Year of the
Amended Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 201, 202 (2008).
56. See, e.g., Beisner, supra note 8, at 563 (“The advent of electronic discovery has
significantly raised the stakes in discovery abuse.”); Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging,
Defining the Problem of Cost in Federal Civil Litigation, 60 DUKE L.J. 765, 785 (2010) (“[I]n
cases in which the defendant was both a producing and requesting party with respect to ESI,
costs were approximately 17 percent higher than in cases without electronic discovery.”).
57. For example, in 2005 ExxonMobil submitted a report to the Standing Committee
claiming that its U.S.-based servers alone contained more than 500 terabytes of data. If
preserved in physical copies, this figure would represent approximately 250 billion typewritten
pages, or a single stack of pages nearly 16,000 miles high. Letter from Charles A. Beach,
Coordinator, Corp. Litig., ExxonMobil Corp., to Peter G. McCabe, Sec’y, Comm. on Rules of
Practice & Procedure (Feb. 11, 2005), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/
rules/e-discovery/04-CV-002.pdf [http://perma.cc/QT8K-VZDQ].
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tapes and hard drives. Even with technologically advanced search
functions that have made it easier to sift through electronic
documents, the very nature of electronic communication can make
such searches increasingly complex because “[t]he casual milieu of
email and other electronic communications . . . gives rise to linguistic
59
ambiguities that further complicate the reviewer’s task.” It should
thus come as no surprise that Duke Conference contributors
identified ESI as a primary cost driver in litigation, with one major
company estimating that the cost of producing one gigabyte of data
60
falls between $5,000 and $7,000. Given that a “midsize” case
61
typically involves 500 gigabytes of data, commentators were
justifiably concerned that “[t]he rising costs associated with electronic
discovery threaten to drive all but the largest cases out of the
62
system.”
b. The Development of Rule 37(e). In the early 2000s both the
American Bar Association and the Judicial Conference recognized
63
the need to develop ESI-specific guidelines, and the 2006
amendments implemented several important changes to e-discovery
procedure. For example, the amendments created specific provisions
governing the discovery of ESI identified as “not reasonably
64
accessible” and directed parties to address ESI issues at the Rule 26
65
discovery conference. Perhaps the most important change, however,
was the addition of the Rule 37(e) safe harbor from sanctions for lost
66
ESI. As the 2006 amendments’ Committee Note (2006 Committee
Note) explains, Rule 37(e) provides a safe harbor against sanctions
58. See Beisner, supra note 8, at 565 (2010) (“The harsh reality is that the costs of
producing electronic documents far exceed those of producing paper documents.”).
59. Id. at 566.
60. See INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM,
ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY: A VIEW FROM THE FRONT LINES 5 (2008), (discussing the litigation
costs of ESI), http://iaals.du.edu/images/wygwam/documents/publications/EDiscovery_View_
Front_Lines2007.pdf [http://perma.cc/ABW9-JUJB].
61. Id.
62. Beisner, supra note 8, at 567; see also Shira A. Scheindlin & Jonathan M. Redgrave,
Special Masters and E-Discovery: The Intersection of Two Recent Revisions to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 347, 355 (2008) (identifying the four attributes of ESI
cited by the Advisory Committee as its reasons for adopting an ESI-specific amendment).
63. See Burns et al., supra note 55, at 202–03 (describing the “[t]wo simultaneous
developments [that] occurred in the early 2000s to address the discovery of ESI in litigation”).
64. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
65. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(3)(C).
66. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e).
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for a party that loses discoverable ESI “without culpable conduct on
67
its part.” Prompted by the concern that courts too readily imposed
68
sanctions for innocent failures to produce ESI, the provision
addressed a preservation issue unique to electronic materials. Unlike
physical documents—the spoliation of which would typically require a
conscious decision to destroy evidence—ESI can be inadvertently
overwritten or destroyed in the course of automatic processes
69
“essential to . . . the ordinary operation of computer systems.”
Although subsection (e) is among the shortest provisions of Rule
37, several of its phrases merit close examination. First, the Rule
limits itself by providing a safe harbor only from sanctions imposed
70
“under these rules,” preserving the trial court’s long-recognized
71
ability to sanction parties under its own inherent powers. The 2006
72
Committee Note makes this limitation explicit, creating a loophole
through which courts have justified sanctions that might otherwise be
73
inappropriate under the 37(e) safe harbor. As discussed below, this
is one source of confusion the Advisory Committee hopes to resolve
74
in the current amendments package.
Another key internal limitation in Rule 37(e) lies in the phrase
“electronically stored information lost as a result of the routine . . .
75
operation of an electronic information system.” According to the
2006 Committee Note, “routine” refers to “the ways in which such
systems are generally designed, programmed, and implemented to
76
meet the party’s technical and business needs.” Thus, the provision

67. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment.
68. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 16, § 2281.
69. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment.
70. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e).
71. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (“It has long been understood
that ‘[c]ertain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the nature of
their institution,’ powers ‘which cannot be dispensed with in a Court, because they are necessary
to the exercise of all others.’” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Hudson, 7
Cranch 32, 34 (1812))).
72. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment. (“The
protection provided by Rule 37([e]) applies only to sanctions ‘under these rules.’ It does not
affect other sources of authority to impose sanctions or rules of professional responsibility.”).
73. See, e.g., Nucor Corp. v. Bell, 251 F.R.D. 191, 196 n.3 (D.S.C. 2008) (“Rule 37(e)’s plain
language states that it only applies to sanctions imposed under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (e.g., a sanction made under Rule 37(b) for failing to obey a court order), [sic] Thus,
the rule is not applicable when the court sanctions a party pursuant to its inherent powers.”).
74. See infra notes 153–155.
75. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e).
76. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment.
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precludes spoliation sanctions for “the alteration and overwriting of
information, often without the operator’s specific direction or
77
awareness.” This language reflects the Committee’s understanding
that ESI systems almost always incorporate automatic overwriting
functions crucial to the efficient operation of the network, an
78
attribute that distinguishes ESI from physical documents.
Accordingly, the reference to “routine operation” establishes a
presumption that data-destruction protocols implemented to meet
79
legitimate business needs fall within the Rule 37(e) safe harbor.
As the majority of sophisticated litigants employ “routine” ESI
retention systems, most Rule 37(e) disputes tend to turn on whether
80
the party’s use of its systems constitutes “good-faith operation.”
Whereas the “routine” nature of a document management system
implicates the design and function of the system itself, the “goodfaith” element focuses on the party’s conduct in using (or suspending)
81
the system in anticipation of litigation. On this point, the 2006
Committee Note instructs that “[g]ood faith . . . may involve a party’s
intervention to modify or suspend certain features of that routine
operation to prevent the loss of information, if that information is
82
subject to a preservation obligation.” Though no finding of intent is
explicitly required to negate good faith, the purpose of this element is
to prevent parties from “exploit[ing] the routine operation of an
information system to thwart discovery obligations by allowing that
operation to continue in order to destroy specific stored information
83
that it is required to preserve.” This has become the critical
determination for courts applying Rule 37(e), and the ambiguity

77. Id.
78. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 16, § 2284.1 (“For reasons unrelated to the availability
of information for use in litigation, such a system may often alter or destroy information. This
characteristic of electronic information systems has no direct parallel in regard to hard-copy
materials.”).
79. Cf. S. New Eng. Tel. Co. v. Global NAPs, Inc., 251 F.R.D. 82, 93 (D. Conn. 2008)
(holding that defendant’s conscious decision to use the “wash with bleach” feature of its
document retention system—as opposed to the “default mode”—did not constitute “routine,
good-faith operation”).
80. See infra note 118.
81. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 16, § 2284.1 (“One feature of good faith design of a
computer information system would be to comply with any pertinent obligations to preserve
information within the control of the party.”).
82. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment.
83. Id.
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surrounding the implied-culpability requirement was one of the
84
primary issues driving the current amendment process.
B. Rule 37(e) in Practice
Though Rule 37(e) may have initially appeared to be a simple
method of ensuring that parties would not be liable for the innocent
loss of ESI, the safe harbor provision’s history since 2006 shows that
the provision’s protections have proven largely ineffective. Post-2007
spoliation case law suggests that Rule 37(e) suffers from two crucial
points of ambiguity: the lack of a clear preservation obligation and
the varying standards applied to the phrase “routine, good-faith
85
operation.” When parties cannot be sure what preservation
standards the court will employ, they will logically overpreserve at
great cost to both physical resources and human capital. Furthermore,
a problematic circuit split developed as to the culpability required for
the most severe sanctions of adverse inferences and default
86
judgments. After a thorough examination of these issues, the Duke
Conference concluded that Rule 37(e) required substantial revision to
provide parties with clear, workable guidelines for ESI preservation
and production.
1. Threshold Issues and the Problem of “Good Faith.” Rule 37,
the trial court’s proverbial “stick” for enforcing the FRCP discovery
rules, offers district court judges a variety of curative measures. Its
enumerated sanctions are not exclusive but rather “flexible, selective,
and plural” and district courts may “use as many and as varied
87
sanctions as are necessary to hold the scales of justice even.” This
broad discretion has produced varying standards for the
circumstances under which sanctions are appropriate and the type of
sanctions that should apply, and a circuit split on the criteria for
88
reviewing the imposition of sanctions. District judges have
84. See infra Part II.A.3.
85. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e).
86. See infra notes 118–119 and accompanying text.
87. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 16, § 2284.
88. See, e.g., Wanderer v. Johnston, 910 F.2d 652, 656 (9th Cir. 1990) (implementing a fivefactor test for reviewing sanctions of dismissal or default); Mut. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v.
Richards & Assocs., Inc., 872 F.2d 88, 92 (4th Cir. 1989) (articulating a four-factor test that
includes “whether the noncomplying party acted in bad faith” but no criteria regarding the
public interest in resolving cases on the merits). For a comprehensive survey of Rule 37
standards of review, see generally WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 16, § 2284 nn.36–38 and
accompanying text.

O’BRIEN IN PRINTER-FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

ANALOG SOLUTIONS

10/30/2015 11:14 AM

165

traditionally refused to order sanctions until the offending party has a
chance to cure the prejudice, but over the past thirty years courts
have become increasingly willing to look to sanctions for their
89
deterrent effects.
Before considering sanctions, the court must first determine that
90
the lost information should have been preserved. Although the
common-law duty to preserve evidence is fairly developed in
91
spoliation case law, this threshold issue presents unique challenges in
the context of ESI. Computer-system architects—especially those
who develop large corporate networks—typically implement
automatic-destruction software for outdated files, and thus the
“should have been preserved” issue will often turn on when (or if) a
92
party implemented a litigation hold on its ESI systems. As Judge
Shira Scheindlin noted in her famously comprehensive set of opinions
on electronic-discovery spoliation issued in Zubulake v. UBS
93
Warburg LLC, the litigation hold is “only the beginning” of a party’s
94
ESI-preservation obligations. Counsel must remain actively engaged
in ESI preservation throughout discovery and take reasonable
“affirmative steps to monitor compliance so that all sources of
95
discoverable information are identified and searched.” This rigorous
standard for ESI preservation makes sense given that electronic files,
unlike physical evidence, can be permanently destroyed if the
custodian simply neglects to halt the document-management system’s
standard deletion processes.
96
As discussed above, Rule 37(e) provides a safe harbor “to help
companies escape sanction when their systems automatically caused
89. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 16, § 2284.
90. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 229 F.R.D. 422, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that
the party seeking sanctions for spoliation must establish, inter alia, “that the destroyed evidence
was ‘relevant’ to the party’s claim or defense”).
91. See, e.g., Micron Tech., Inc. v. Rambus, Inc., 645 F.3d 1311, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(holding that the duty to preserve is “an objective standard, asking not whether the party in fact
reasonably foresaw litigation, but whether a reasonable party in the same factual circumstances
would have reasonably foreseen litigation”); E*Trade Sec. LLC v. Deutsche Bank AG, 230
F.R.D. 582, 588 (D. Minn. 2005) (“The obligation to preserve evidence begins when a party
knows or should have known that the evidence is relevant to future or current litigation.”).
92. See Zubulake, 229 F.R.D. at 431 (“Once a party reasonably anticipates litigation, it
must suspend its routine document retention/destruction policy and put in place a ‘litigation
hold’ to ensure the preservation of relevant documents.”).
93. Id. at 422.
94. Id. at 432.
95. Id.
96. See supra Part I.A.2.b.
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the destruction of ESI even though they were under a duty to
97
preserve.” Under the safe-harbor provision, a party should be safe
from sanctions so long as it lost ESI through the “routine, good-faith
98
operation” of its preservation systems. Unfortunately, the 2006
Committee Note provides little guidance as to the meaning of “good
faith” and courts have developed varying approaches that often
conflate the “good faith” and “should have been preserved”
99
determinations.
100
In Columbia Pictures Industries v. Bunnell, plaintiffs sought
spoliation sanctions for defendants’ failure to produce their website’s
server log data, which automatically stored a site visitor’s information
101
for approximately six hours before deleting it permanently. The
court found that defendants would have an obligation to preserve the
server log data going forward but declined to impose sanctions under
the Rule 37(e) “good faith” provision because defendants had neither
refused a specific request for the data nor violated a preservation
102
order. Though the court couched its decision in the Rule 37(e) safe
harbor, the opinion suggests this decision turned not on “good faith”
103
but rather on the lack of a preservation obligation.
104
Doe v. Norwalk Community College, decided shortly after the
2006 amendments, illustrates an even narrower interpretation of the
Rule 37(e) “good faith” provision. In Doe, the plaintiff sought
sanctions for spoliation of emails and documents allegedly scrubbed
from the defendant’s computer system after the plaintiff had filed her

97. Burns et al., supra note 55, at 217.
98. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e).
99. See, e.g., Trask-Morton v. Motel 6 Operating L.P., 534 F.3d 672, 682 (7th Cir. 2008)
(upholding denial of motions for sanctions due to defendant’s lack of bad faith in destroying
backup tapes prior to receiving demand letter from plaintiffs); Connor v. Sun Trust Bank, 546 F.
Supp. 2d 1360, 1376–77 (N.D. Ga. 2008) (finding bad faith in defendant’s affirmative deletion of
“undisputedly relevant” emails that “may have existed at the time the duty to preserve arose”);
Alexander v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 541 F. Supp. 2d 274, 305 (D.D.C. 2008) (refusing to
impose sanctions due to lack of “clear and convincing evidence that [defendants] acted in bad
faith, with an intent to mislead this Court”).
100. Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Bunnell, No. CV 06-1093, 2007 WL 2080419 (C.D. Cal.
May 29, 2007).
101. Id. at *2–3, *13.
102. Id. at *14.
103. See id. (holding that defendants’ failure to retain the data was based in good faith due
to the absence of “a specific request by defendants [sic] to preserve Server Log Data present
solely in RAM and . . . a violation of a preservation order”).
104. Doe v. Norwalk Cmty. Coll., 248 F.R.D. 372 (D. Conn. 2007).
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complaint but before her initial discovery request for the data. The
district court imposed an adverse-inference sanction and refused to
apply the Rule 37(e) safe harbor, holding that “in order to take
advantage of the good faith exception, a party needs to act
affirmatively to prevent the system from destroying or altering
information, even if such destruction would occur in the regular
106
course of business.” Critical to the court’s reasoning was its finding
that the “defendants failed to suspend [their system] at any time”
after litigation commenced, suggesting that a failure to implement a
litigation hold after the filing of a complaint precludes a finding of
107
good faith under Rule 37(e).
These rulings show how the Rule 37(e) safe-harbor provision has
proven difficult to enforce in light of the confusion surrounding the
108
duty to preserve ESI. Though the Advisory Committee may have
hoped the rule would provide some protection for litigants who
innocently lose ESI in the course of business, the ambiguity of
“routine, good-faith operation” has led courts to interpret the safe
harbor narrowly, relying primarily on the common-law duty to
109
preserve. As a result, potential litigants face the difficult choice of
either preserving all ESI at great cost or risking severe spoliation
sanctions when litigation does indeed arise.
2. The Duke Conference and the Road to Reform. In May 2010,
the Advisory Committee held the Duke Conference to address
concerns that “the costs and delays in the federal civil-litigation
110
system were impeding rather than promoting the goals of Rule 1.”
The Conference prompted “an extraordinary outpouring of empirical
research, scholarly commentary, and thoughtful input” on the state of
the civil-litigation system and directly led to the current amendment
111
process. Discovery procedure was a central topic at the conference,

105. Id. at 375.
106. Id. at 378.
107. Id.
108. See Burns et al., supra note 55, at 217 (“[I]f the party cannot avail itself of the safe
harbor because it had a duty to preserve data in the first instance, then Rule 37 does little to
change the state of the pre-existing common law.”).
109. See, e.g., Oklahoma ex rel. Edmonson v. Tyson Foods, No. 05-CV-329, 2007 WL
1498973, at *6 (N.D. Okla. May 17, 2007) (warning that parties “should be very cautious in
relying upon any ‘safe harbor’ doctrine as described in new Rule 37([e])”).
110. Koeltl, supra note 12, at 538–39.
111. Id.
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and contributors identified discovery as a primary source of excessive
cost in modern litigation.
Two specific issues from the Duke Conference provide
important context for understanding the current FRCP amendments
package. First, conference participants argued that the ubiquity of
ESI in modern litigation exacerbates the discovery process’s
112
inefficiencies and significantly contributes to rising costs.
As
discussed above, contributors unanimously agreed that ESI presents
unique discovery challenges compared to physical evidence and thus
113
merits distinct, careful treatment under the FRCP. Second, experts
identified discovery sanctions’ uncertain criteria as a major source of
114
confusion and cost before and during litigation. The Conference
leaders recommended substantial revisions to the FRCP, starting the
reform process that would lead to the current package of amendment
proposals.
Aside from the specific discovery problems created by the
increasing prevalence of ESI, the primary discovery-related concern
at the Duke Conference was the issue of spoliation sanctions. Given
the increased costs associated with ESI production, some contributors
felt that the threat of severe sanctions had become a “nuclear weapon
that [could] be used to force large organizations to settle frivolous
115
cases.” A comprehensive empirical study presented at the Duke
Conference found that sanctions motions and awards in cases
involving e-discovery had significantly increased between 2004 and
2010; as a result, the authors claimed, ESI-related sanctions “[were] at
116
an all-time high.”
Conference commentators criticized Rule 37(e)’s purported safe
harbor, with one study finding that only two cases per year had met
the safe harbor’s requirements since 2006 and that courts “ha[d] not
shown a propensity to give the safe harbor broad and ready
117
application.” Particularly problematic was the circuit split on the
required culpability for the severe sanctions of adverse inferences and
112. See Beisner, supra note 8, at 564–70 (discussing numerous ways in which electronic
discovery “significantly” increases the costs of discovery); Koeltl, supra note 12, at 540 (“It is
plain that, although the cost of discovery in the median case may be reasonable . . . , the costs in
high-stakes litigation can be enormous.”).
113. See supra Part I.A.2.a.
114. See supra Part I.B.
115. Beisner, supra note 8, at 571.
116. Willoughby et al., supra note 9, at 790–91.
117. Id. at 826–27.
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dismissal. In the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits,
such sanctions required a finding of wrongful intent or “bad faith” in
118
the destruction or overwriting of data. In contrast, the First, Second,
Third, Fourth, Sixth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits held that bad faith may
be relevant, but mere negligence in destroying ESI can merit severe
119
sanctions when significant prejudice is shown. In the absence of a
uniform culpability standard for discovery sanctions, parties feel
pressure to overpreserve ESI at great cost to minimize the risk of
facing sanctions for negligent data loss. Analysis of the Rule 37(e)
amendments proposed since the Duke Conference shows that this
confusion over sanctions standards was among the most pressing
120
issues facing the Advisory Committee.
The findings and testimony presented at the Duke Conference
led its participants to several important conclusions. First, there was
118. See, e.g., Bracey v. Grondin, 712 F.3d 1012, 1020 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Simply establishing a
duty to preserve evidence or even the negligent destruction of evidence does not automatically
entitle a litigant to an adverse inference instruction in this circuit.”); Aramburu v. Boeing Co.,
112 F.3d 1398, 1407 (10th Cir. 1997) (“The adverse inference must be predicated on the bad
faith of the party destroying the records.”); Rimkus Consulting Grp. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp.
2d 598, 614 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (“As a general rule, in this circuit, the severe sanctions of granting
default judgment, striking pleadings, or giving adverse inference instructions may not be
imposed unless there is evidence of ‘bad faith.’” (quoting Condrey v. SunTrust Bank of Ga., 431
F.3d 191, 203 (5th Cir. 2005))).
119. See, e.g., Chin v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 685 F.3d 135, 162 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[A]
finding of gross negligence merely permits, rather than requires, a district court to give an
adverse inference instruction.”); Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d
99, 108 (2d Cir. 2002) (“The sanction of an adverse inference may be appropriate in some cases
involving the negligent destruction of evidence because each party should bear the risk of its
own negligence.”); Zest IP Holdings v. Implant Direct Mfg., No. 10–0541, 2013 WL 6159177, at
*9 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2013) (denying terminating sanctions but granting an adverse inference
instruction when “[d]efendants were at least negligent in not implementing a litigation hold”);
SJS Distrib. Sys. v. Sam’s East, No. 11–CV–1229, 2013 WL 5596010, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 11,
2013) (“In order to remedy the evidentiary imbalance created by the destruction of evidence, an
adverse inference may be appropriate, even in the absence of a showing that the spoliator acted
in bad faith.”); Food Serv. of Am. v. Carrington, No. CV–12–00175, 2013 WL 4507593, at *22
(D. Ariz. Aug. 23, 2013) (“‘[A] finding of bad faith is not a prerequisite’ to an imposition of an
adverse inference.” (quoting Glover v. BIC, 6 F.3d 1318, 1329 (9th Cir. 1993))); Woodard v.
Ford Motor Co., No. 1:11–cv–3092, 2013 WL 3024828, at *4 (D. Ore. June 13, 2013) (“A finding
of prejudice need not be based on bad faith by the spoliating party: even if a plaintiff was
minimally culpable, dismissal may be necessary if the prejudice to the defendant is
extraordinary, denying it the ability to adequately defend its case.”); Gatto v. United Air Lines,
Inc., No. 10–cv–1090, 2013 WL 1285285, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 25, 2013) (granting an adverse
inference and holding that “so long as the evidence is relevant, the offending party’s culpability
is largely irrelevant”); Montoya v. Orange Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t., No. 11–1922, 2013 WL
6705992, at *13 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2013) (granting an adverse inference instruction despite “no
suggestion of bad faith or deliberate destruction of evidence”).
120. See infra Part II.A.3.
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“substantial agreement” on “the need for [even more] active judicial
121
management of litigation.” As several commentators observed,
contention and distrust between parties tends to increase costs in
122
pretrial disputes; thus, the Duke Conference called for a greater
degree of court involvement in discovery procedure “as a way of
assuring that proceedings are conducted in such a way that their costs
123
are proportionate to the stakes of the litigation.” In a similar vein,
Conference participants observed that rule changes “can only go so
far to curb abuse” and stressed the importance of cooperation
124
between parties in ensuring cost-effective and efficient litigation.
According to the Duke Conference, the solution to out-of-control
cost and delay lies in a combination of active, thorough case
management and a substantial change in the culture of civil litigation
between opposing parties.
But the Conference’s most important conclusion was perhaps the
“consensus that a rule addressing preservation (spoliation) [of ESI]
would be a valuable addition to the Federal Rules of Civil
125
Procedure.” Although there was some disagreement as to whether a
126
rule change could effectively address discovery abuse, the Duke
Conference’s E-Discovery Panel (the E-Discovery Panel or Panel)
ultimately recommended that the Duke Conference’s Standing
Committee (the Standing Committee) develop an ESI-specific
127
preservation rule. The Panel suggested a set of important elements
for such a rule, including a “trigger” point for the duty to preserve

121. Koeltl, supra note 12, at 542.
122. See, e.g., Lee & Willging, supra note 56, at 784 (“Contention among the parties also
increases costs, at least for defendants.”); Craig B. Shaffer & Ryan T. Shaffer, Looking Past the
Debate: Proposed Revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 7 FED. CTS. L. REV. 178,
178 (2013) (“The adversary character of civil discovery, with substantial reinforcement from the
economic structure of our legal system, promotes practices that systematically impede the
attainment of the principal purposes for which discovery was designed.”).
123. Koeltl, supra note 12, at 542.
124. Id. at 545; see also The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Conference Cooperation
Proclamation, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 331, 331 (2009) (“[A]ll stakeholders in the system . . . have
an interest in establishing a culture of cooperation in the discovery process. Over-contentious
discovery is a cost that has outstripped any advantage in the face of ESI and the data deluge.”).
125. Koeltl, supra note 12, at 544.
126. Compare Lee & Willging, supra note 56, at 768 (arguing that “there is scant evidence
that alternative discovery rules would result in lower costs or shorter processing times in any
predictable fashion”), with Joseph, supra note 51, at 7 (calling for rules “to define and
circumscribe the pre-litigation duty to preserve [ESI]”).
127. 2010 E-Discovery Panel Memorandum, supra note 21, at 1.
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These
ESI and a clear standard for discovery sanctions.
recommendations became the starting point for the amendment
process that produced the package of proposals currently before
Congress.
II. THE AMENDMENT PROCESS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
CURRENT PROPOSALS
129

Armed with an “unprecedented array” of empirical findings
and scholarly commentary, the Advisory Committee left the Duke
Conference with the impression that the federal civil-litigation system
works fairly well but could be improved in several important respects.
The Advisory Committee acknowledged the widespread concern that
courts were not applying the FRCP discovery rules consistently and
confusion over preservation obligations and sanctions—exacerbated
by the ever-increasing prevalence of ESI—had made the discovery
130
process inefficient and costly. Furthermore, the Committee felt that
judges “must be considerably more involved in managing each case
from the outset” in order to develop and enforce the appropriate
131
scope of discovery on a case-by-case basis. Finally, and perhaps
most importantly, the Committee noted that simply amending the
FRCP is likely “not sufficient to make meaningful improvements” to
132
the overall state of the civil-justice system. In its Report to the Chief
Justice following the Duke Conference, the Advisory Committee
neatly summarized its goals for the impending amendment process:
“What is needed can be described in two words—cooperation and
proportionality—and one phrase—sustained, active, hands-on judicial
133
case management.”
This Part analyzes the amendment process thematically rather
than chronologically. The context of the separate issues the Advisory
Committee sought to address illuminates how the proposed
amendments have developed throughout the notice-and-comment
process. After laying out the specific questions facing the Advisory

128. Id. at 5–7.
129. JUDICIAL CONF. ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE
OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE 2010 CONFERENCE ON CIVIL LITIGATION 1, http://
www.uscourts.gov/file/reporttothechiefjusticepdf [http://perma.cc/H7T9-C99C].
130. Id. at 3–4.
131. Id. at 4.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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Committee in its attempt to fix Rule 37(e), Section A discusses the
various ways in which the early rule proposals answered each
question and tracks the development of the Committee’s approach.
Section B examines the amendment in its current form as submitted
to Congress in April 2015.
A. Early Efforts
Drawing on the recommendations of the Duke Conference, the
Advisory Committee developed its Rule 37(e) amendment proposals
with several important questions in mind: (1) whether the rule should
apply to ESI or to all forms of evidence, (2) whether the rule should
set out its own duty to preserve or continue to rely on the commonlaw duty, (3) how best to resolve the circuit split regarding the
required culpability for severe sanctions, and (4) whether to include a
nonexclusive list of factors for judges to weigh when considering
sanctions. Analysis of these four issues shows how the Committee,
initially ambitious in its reform efforts, gradually pared down its
proposals over time.
Since the Duke Conference, the Advisory Committee has
published four versions of the proposed Rule 37(e): two in January
134
135
2013 (Primary 2013 Proposal and Alternative 2013 Proposal ), one
136
in April 2014 (Penultimate Proposal ), and the version presently
137
under congressional review (Current Proposal or Proposal ). This
Section analyzes the first three proposals, which the Committee
produced after extensive hearings and Committee meetings between
138
2010 and 2013. Though the Committee’s early attempts were
perhaps slightly overambitious, they contained several important
elements that, unfortunately, did not survive in the current package of
amendments.

134. For the full text of the Primary 2013 Proposal, see ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES,
U.S. COURTS, ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE – APRIL 2013, at 152–
53 [hereinafter 2013 AGENDA BOOK], http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/
Agenda%20Books/Civil/CV2013-04.pdf [http://perma.cc/679G-5KHP].
135. For the full text of the Alternative 2013 Proposal, see id. at 160–61.
136. For the full text of the Penultimate Proposal, see 2014 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 20,
at 383–84.
137. For the full text of the Current Proposal, see infra Part II.B.
138. See 2013 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 134, at 143 (discussing the creation of the
proposals after multiple Committee meetings).
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1. Confining the Rule to ESI. As a threshold matter, the
Committee had to decide whether the new Rule 37(e) should be
limited to ESI or whether it should apply to all types of discoverable
evidence. The current version of Rule 37(e) applies only to ESI, yet
the Primary 2013 Proposal contained no such restriction and would
have applied whenever “a party failed to preserve discoverable
information that should have been preserved in the anticipation or
139
conduct of litigation.” In its explanatory materials the Committee
provided little justification for the decision to apply the rule to all
types of discoverable information, observing simply that “[t]he
amended rule is designed to ensure that potential litigants who make
reasonable efforts to satisfy their preservation responsibilities may do
so with confidence that they will not be subjected to serious sanctions
140
should information be lost despite those efforts.” Evidently this was
a point of serious disagreement, and “[a]fter considerable discussion”
the Committee decided to publish the Alternative 2013 Proposal,
which was mostly identical to the Primary 2013 Proposal but would
apply only when “a party failed to preserve discoverable
electronically stored information that should have been preserved in
141
the anticipation or conduct of litigation.” Proponents of the
Alternative 2013 Proposal argued that ESI requires separate
sanctions standards because, unlike physical evidence, “ESI tends to
proliferate and usually can be found on many computers and servers,
reducing the chance that its loss would have the same dire
consequences as [would the] loss of the key piece of tangible evidence
142
in a case.”
These Committee members concluded that the
traditional common-law standards for physical evidence do not make
143
sense for ESI.
This viewpoint evidently won out, and the Committee became
“firmly convinced that a rule addressing the loss of ESI in civil
144
litigation is greatly needed.” Thus the Penultimate Proposal, like
the Alternative 2013 Proposal, applied only when “a party failed to
preserve electronically stored information that should have been
145
preserved in the anticipation or conduct of litigation.” As the 2006
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 152.
Id. at 154.
Id. at 150, 160–61.
Id. at 150.
Id. at 150–51.
2014 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 20, at 370.
Id. at 383.
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Committee Note explained, this decision followed extensive
comments regarding the unique challenges of ESI preservation and
testimony that “the explosion of ESI will continue and even
146
accelerate.” Accordingly, the Committee concluded that “[t]he need
for broad trial court discretion in dealing with these challenges will
147
likewise increase.” As with the other key issues discussed below, the
approach to this question shows the Advisory Committee’s tendency
to start with sweeping reforms and gradually narrow its focus over
subsequent proposals.
2. The Duty to Preserve. The other significant threshold issue
was whether the new ESI rule should, as advocated by the chairman
of the Duke Conference E-Discovery Panel, “specify the point in time
148
when the obligation to preserve information” attaches. As discussed
above, the current rule’s reliance on the common-law preservation
duty has led to a variety of standards among the circuit courts and has
149
sometimes swallowed the “routine, good-faith” element. Although
the Duke Conference participants may have hoped that the
Committee would take this reform process as an opportunity to
clarify the duty to preserve ESI, the Committee members ultimately
decided that such a task was simply too involved and case specific for
150
the FRCP to resolve.
Despite the E-Discovery Panel’s calls for clarification on the
duty to preserve, the Advisory Committee declined to address the
issue in its 2013 proposals. It was not until the promulgation of the
Penultimate Proposal in April 2014 that the Committee declared that
the new Rule 37(e) would “not itself create a duty to preserve” but
151
rather would “take[] the duty as it is established by case law.”
Claiming that “case law is well developed and fairly consistent in this
area,” the Committee explained that there was no need for an ESIspecific duty because “[t]he massive scope of electronic
information . . . means that ample information for effective litigation
often remains available even when it is not possible to know with
152
certainty what information was contained in the lost source.”
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 371.
Id.
2010 E-Discovery Panel Memorandum, supra note 21, at 5.
See supra Part I.B.1.
2014 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 20, at 372–73.
Id. at 370.
Id. at 372–73.
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Implicit in this somewhat-tautological justification is the Advisory
Committee’s view that the duty to preserve is not as important in
ESI-spoliation cases because alternative sources are often available
for the lost information. As a result, none of the proposals
promulgated to date have attempted to define the duty to preserve
ESI and have instead opted to continue relying on the non-uniform,
common-law duty.
3. Curative Measures and Severe Sanctions: Resolving the Circuit
Split. In each of the early rule proposals the Advisory Committee
sought to bifurcate the sanctions determination into two
circumstances: those that merit severe sanctions (adverse inferences
153
and dismissal) and those that justify only “curative measures” (for
example, ordering additional discovery or permitting the introduction
at trial of evidence of the lost ESI). These changes represent the most
significant aspect of the amendment process, as Duke Conference
participants identified the circuit split on the required culpability for
severe sanctions as the primary source of uncertainty surrounding
154
ESI-preservation obligations. First, the Advisory Committee took
definitive steps to “foreclose[] reliance on inherent authority or state
155
law to impose litigation sanctions” by eliminating the “under these
rules” loophole that currently allows courts to avoid the Rule 37(e)
156
safe harbor. Having isolated the sanctions power to the FRCP, the
Committee set out to provide definitive guidelines for severe
sanctions and curative measures.
On this issue, the 2013 proposals were again the most sweeping
and, as the Advisory Committee discovered, problematically
complicated. For example, under the Primary 2013 Proposal the
court, after determining that the party failed to preserve discoverable
information, would have the power to:
(A) permit additional discovery, order curative measures, or order
the party to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees,
caused by the failure; and

153. Id. at 373.
154. See supra notes 117–120 and accompanying text.
155. 2013 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 134, at 155.
156. As discussed above, courts have used the phrase “under these rules” to justify imposing
sanctions based on inherent power regardless of the applicability of Rule 37(e). See supra notes
70–73 and accompanying text.
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(B) impose any sanction listed in Rule 37(b)(2)(A) or give an
adverse-inference jury instruction, but only if the court finds that the
failure:
(i) caused substantial prejudice in the litigation and was willful or
in bad faith; or
(ii) irreparably deprived a party of any meaningful opportunity to
present or defend against the claims in the action and was
157
negligent or grossly negligent.

The Committee Note accompanying this proposal clarifies the
Advisory Committee’s approach. Absent a finding of bad faith or
substantial prejudice, subdivision (A) authorizes only “measures that
are not sanctions”—that is, curative orders that do not involve a
158
default judgment or adverse inference instruction. These less severe
options, such as ordering additional discovery or permitting the
introduction of evidence of the lost information at trial, reflect the
Committee’s view that courts “should employ the least severe
159
sanction” necessary to mitigate the effects of the loss.
Subdivision (B) further partitions the court’s analysis based on
the party’s degree of culpability, authorizing the most severe
sanctions only upon one of two further findings. First, the court must
determine that “the loss of information caused substantial prejudice
160
in the litigation.” If, as is often the case with ESI, substitute
evidence is available from other sources, the court would be limited
to the curative measures available under subdivision (A).
Alternatively, the court must conclude that “the party that failed to
preserve did so willfully or in bad faith . . . with reference to the
161
factors identified in Rule 37(e)(2).” A narrow exception to the “bad
faith” requirement lies in subdivision (B)(ii), which permits severe
sanctions for negligent loss of evidence only in those “extremely rare”
cases “in which the only evidence of a critically important event has
162
been lost.”
The Alternative 2013 Proposal modifies these standards slightly
by eliminating the negligence exception so the rule would instead
read as follows:
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

2013 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 134, at 152.
Id. at 155.
Id. at 157.
Id. at 156.
Id.
Id. at 157.
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(A) permit additional discovery, order curative measures, or order
the party to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees,
caused by the failure; and
(B) impose any sanction listed in Rule 37(b)(2)(A) or give an
adverse-inference jury instruction, but only if the court finds that the
failure caused substantial prejudice in the litigation and was willful
163
or in bad faith.

Aside from limiting the rule to ESI, this is the only significant
difference between the two 2013 proposals. The change reflects some
Advisory Committee members’ concerns that a negligence exception
might allow severe sanctions for ESI “lost through an Act of God”
and even “swallow the rule” by giving courts the ability to impose
164
default judgments or adverse inferences for mere negligence.
Once again, proponents of the Alternative 2013 Proposal
prevailed and the Penultimate Proposal omitted the negligence
exception and allowed severe sanctions “only upon a finding that the
party acted with the intent to deprive another party of the
165
information’s use in the litigation.” As the Advisory Committee
explained, this decision indicates its conclusion that “permitting an
adverse inference for negligence creates powerful incentives to
166
overpreserve, often at great cost.” Thus, the Committee evidently
decided that the best course was to “preserve[] broad trial court
167
discretion to cure prejudice caused by the loss of ESI,” limiting the
court’s power only by bifurcating the determination into “curative
168
measures” and “sanctions.”
4. The List of Factors. Perhaps the best example of the Advisory
Committee gradually eliminating a major element of the proposed
amendments is its treatment of the nonexclusive list of factors for the
court to weigh when considering sanctions. The list first appeared in
the Primary 2013 Proposal:
(2) Factors to be considered. In determining whether a party failed to
preserve discoverable information that should have been preserved
in the anticipation or conduct of litigation, whether the failure was

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. at 161.
Id. at 150.
2014 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 20, at 383.
Id. at 379.
Id. at 376.
Id. at 373.
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willful or in bad faith, and whether the failure was negligent or
grossly negligent, the court should consider all relevant factors,
including:
(A) the extent to which the party was on notice that litigation was
likely and that the information would be discoverable;
(B) the reasonableness of the party’s efforts to preserve the
information;
(C) whether the party received a request to preserve information,
whether the request was clear and reasonable, and whether the
person who made it and the party engaged in good-faith
consultation about the scope of preservation;
(D) the proportionality of the preservation efforts to any
anticipated or ongoing litigation; and
(E) whether the party timely sought the court’s guidance on any
169
unresolved disputes about preserving discoverable information.

As the Committee Note to this subdivision makes clear, the
enumerated factors are “not exclusive; other considerations may bear
on these decisions . . . [and] the court’s focus should be on the
170
reasonableness of the party’s conduct.” The Committee Note also
provides a detailed explanation of each factor, at several points
instructing courts to be “sensitive to the party’s sophistication” when
171
evaluating discovery conduct. Particularly notable in these factors is
the theme of encouraging parties to engage in “meaningful discussion
of the appropriate preservation regime” so as to “resolve issues
172
concerning preservation before presenting them to the court.”
Following the comment period for the 2013 proposals, the
Committee acknowledged that “[t]he value of any list of factors has
been vigorously debated, and the wisdom of several of the factors also
173
has been questioned.” This was, it seems, the beginning of the end
for the list of relevant factors. The Penultimate Proposal was the last
to contain the list, and even then in shortened form and in brackets so
174
as to denote the disagreement within the Advisory Committee:
(4) In applying Rule 37(e), the court should consider all relevant
factors, including:
(A) the extent to which the party was on notice that litigation was
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

2013 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 134, at 152–53.
Id. at 158.
Id.
Id. at 159.
2014 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 20, at 373.
Id.
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likely and that the information would be relevant;
(B) the reasonableness of the party’s efforts to preserve the
information;
(C) the proportionality of the preservation efforts to any
anticipated or ongoing litigation; and
(D) whether, after commencement of the action, the party timely
sought the court’s guidance on any unresolved disputes about
175
preserving discoverable information.

In the accompanying materials, the Committee explained the
arguments for and against the inclusion of the factors. Opponents
expressed concerns that the list might be mistaken as exclusive, “may
become a routine set of items to be checked off . . . without sufficient
176
care,” or may have been expressed poorly. Those in favor of the
factors stressed that they could provide valuable guidance to courts
making this complex determination, “particularly when acting in an
environment that changes as rapidly as practices change in the
177
electronic storage of information.”
Ultimately, the Advisory
Committee decided to publish the list in brackets so as to invite
comment on whether “it may be better to address the factors only in
178
the Committee Note” as opposed to the text of the rule.
Though the details of these individual proposals are primarily
useful as context for the development of the language in the current
rules package, the amendment process’s general theme is important.
The Committee started with a comprehensive, highly detailed rule
that would provide the clearest possible guidance for courts and
slowly pared down its language in the name of preserving trial court
discretion. As discussed below, this increasingly conservative
approach produced a rule proposal that will likely struggle to address
the serious issues raised by Duke Conference participants.
B. The Current Proposal
Four years of hearings, conferences, proposals, and commentary
came to a head in June 2014 when the Advisory Committee
submitted its latest package of FRCP amendments to the Standing
Committee, which adopted the amendments and passed them on for

175.
176.
177.
178.

Id. at 383–84.
Id. at 380.
Id.
Id. at 373.
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review by the Judicial Conference and the Supreme Court.
Compared to the early attempts, the Current Proposal is remarkably
concise:
(e) FAILURE TO PRESERVE ELECTRONICALLY STORED
INFORMATION. If electronically stored information that should have
been preserved in the anticipation or conduct of litigation is lost
because a party failed to take reasonable steps to preserve it, and it
cannot be restored or replaced through additional discovery, the
court:
(1) upon finding prejudice to another party from loss of the
information, may order measures no greater than necessary to
cure the prejudice; or
(2) only upon finding that the party acted with the intent to
deprive another party of the information’s use in the litigation
may:
(A) presume that the lost information was unfavorable to the
party;
(B) instruct the jury that it may or must presume the
information was unfavorable to the party; or
180
(C) dismiss the action and enter a default judgment.

Like the previous two attempts, the Current Proposal is explicitly
limited to ESI. Similarly, in the Current Proposal the Committee
reaffirmed its commitment to relying on the common-law duty to
preserve. Having concluded that “a detailed rule specifying the
trigger, scope, and duration of a preservation obligation is not
feasible,” the Committee instead opted simply to “craft a rule that
addresses actions courts may take when ESI that should have been
181
preserved is lost.” The accompanying Committee Note provides
scarce guidance regarding the common-law duty, observing simply
that courts “should consider the extent to which a party was on notice
that litigation was likely and that the information would be relevant”
and that a duty to preserve “may in some instances be triggered or
182
clarified by a court order.”
As with the early proposals, the Advisory Committee’s primary
goal appears to be eliminating the circuit split on culpability
179. The Supreme Court approved the amendments, which will take effect December 1,
2015 unless Congress rejects them. See supra note 15.
180. 2014 Rules Memorandum, supra note 22, at Rules App. B-56 to -57.
181. Id. at Rules App. B-15; see also id. at Rules App. B-59 (“Rule 37(e) is based on this
common-law duty [to preserve]; it does not attempt to create a new duty.”).
182. Id. at Rules App. B-59 to -60.
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standards. Though the Current Proposal tightens the Rule’s language,
the overall effect is largely identical to that of the earlier efforts.
Subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2) create separate standards for curative
measures and severe sanctions, with the latter limited to cases in
which a party destroys ESI with the intent to withhold it from the
opposition. This approach, which explicitly “rejects cases . . . that
authorize the giving of adverse-inference instructions on a finding of
negligence or gross negligence,” reflects the Committee’s view that
“[t]he better rule for the negligent or grossly negligent loss of
electronically stored information is to preserve a broad range of
measures to cure prejudice caused by its loss, but to limit the most
183
severe measures to instances of intentional loss or destruction.”
Thus, the primary objective of subdivision (e)(2) is to resolve the
circuit split regarding the degree of culpability required for the most
184
serious sanctions.
Conspicuously absent from the Current Proposal, however, is the
three initial proposals’ list of factors. Not only were the factors struck
from the Current Proposal itself, but the Committee Note also no
longer contains the extensive guidelines that had appeared in the
Committee Notes to the earlier proposals. The Current Proposal’s
accompanying memorandum does not explain this decision, which is
surprising considering that the earlier Committee materials merely
suggested moving the factors to the Committee Note and not
185
eliminating them entirely.
Some of the new language could be read as a reincorporation of
the factors. For example, one notable addition to the Current
Proposal is the limiting phrase “[i]f [ESI] . . . is lost . . . because a
186
party failed to take reasonable steps to preserve it.” This language
addresses the concern that, given ESI’s ever-increasing volume and
complexity, “perfection in preserving all relevant electronically stored
187
information is often impossible.” The Committee Note provides
that courts must “be sensitive to the party’s sophistication with regard
to litigation in evaluating preservation efforts” and recognizes that in
183. Id. at Rules App. B-65.
184. Id. at Rules App. B-17.
185. See, e.g., 2014 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 20, at 373 (“The list may help potential
litigants make reasonable preservation decisions, may help counsel frame effective arguments,
and may help courts to understand and respond to the arguments. On the other hand, it may be
better to address the factors only in the Committee Note.”).
186. 2014 Rules Memorandum, supra note 22, at Rules App. B-56.
187. Id. at Rules App. B-61.
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some cases information “may be destroyed by events outside the
188
Accordingly, this phrase explicitly precludes
party’s control.”
sanctions “when the loss of information occurs despite the party’s
189
reasonable steps to preserve [it].” Thus, one could read this new
phrase as a more succinct version of the factor that instructed the
court to be cognizant of parties’ resources and sophistication when
considering sanctions, but in any event the Current Proposal contains
no actual “list of relevant factors” in any recognizable form.
Reading this amendment in conjunction with the initial proposals
shows how the Advisory Committee gradually narrowed its focus to a
few specific, attainable goals. First, the Current Proposal and
accompanying Committee Note go to considerable lengths to resolve
the circuit split on adverse-inference and default-judgment culpability
requirements. Second, the Committee repeatedly stresses the
importance of preserving the trial court’s broad discretion, scaling
back any attempts at providing explicit guidelines and limiting district
judges only by instructing them to “employ measures ‘no greater than
190
necessary to cure the prejudice’” caused by the loss of ESI. This
approach leaves too much in the hands of the trial court, however,
and will likely do little to prevent costly and inefficient
overpreservation.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED RULE AND RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR REVISION AND ENFORCEMENT
Although this package of amendments represents, on the whole,
a significant improvement over the current e-discovery regime, the
proposed Rule 37(e) will likely prove ineffective in accomplishing the
Duke Conference’s goals due to the Advisory Committee’s
unwillingness to provide more explicit guidelines for the district
court’s determination of sanctions. This Part first discusses the
strengths and weaknesses of the Current Proposal as it stands and
then argues for specific revisions and enforcement approaches that
would help effectuate the Advisory Committee’s stated objectives.

188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at Rules App. B-63.
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A. The Merits of Proposed Rule 37(e) in the Context of the 2014
Rules Package
1. Strengths. Compared to the current version of Rule 37(e), the
Current Proposal contains several major revisions that should
substantially benefit both litigants and district courts. At the most
basic level, eliminating the phrase “under these rules” should have a
much-needed limiting effect on ESI-spoliation sanctions by
precluding resort to the court’s inherent power. This is a small
change, but a critical one—by cabining the court’s sanctioning powers
to the provisions of Rule 37(e), the amendment confines the court’s
discretion to the FRCP standards and assures litigants that judges will
not resort to jurisdiction-specific common-law criteria when
considering a motion for sanctions.
Similarly, the “reasonable steps” provision of the Current
Proposal should, over time, give parties confidence that their
internally developed preservation protocols will insulate them from
some discovery sanctions. The Committee Note provides that
191
“‘reasonable steps’ . . . does not call for perfection.” Although the
“reasonableness” of a party’s efforts is ultimately up to the discretion
of the district court, the language in the Committee Note suggests
that the Committee has rejected a line of cases that approaches strict
liability on the theory that once the duty to preserve attaches, “failure
to preserve evidence resulting in the loss or destruction of relevant
192
information is surely negligent” and thus sanctionable. The Current
Proposal instead creates a “proportionality” approach that is
193
“sensitive to party resources.” Although the Proposal would benefit
from more specific guidance on the duty to preserve, this aspect of
the Proposal is an important step toward clarifying preservation
obligations and “discourag[ing] unfair allegations of preservation
misconduct while simultaneously promoting compliance and reducing
194
unnecessary overpreservation.”
Finally, the Current Proposal should effectively resolve the
circuit split regarding culpability for severe sanctions. The Committee
191. Id. at Rules App. B-61.
192. Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 685
F. Supp. 2d 456, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
193. 2014 Rules Memorandum, supra note 22, at Rules App. B-61.
194. THOMAS Y. ALLMAN, LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, THE CIVIL RULES PACKAGE AS
PRESENTED TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE (SEPT. 2014), at 17, http://www.lfcj.com/
uploads/3/8/0/5/38050985/2014commentsonrulepackageoct11.pdf [http://perma.cc/3FP9-DY7H].
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Note explicitly rejects Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge
195
Financial Corp., the leading case for the proposition that negligent
loss of discoverable information is sufficient for the most serious of
196
the discovery sanctions. To the extent that it precludes reliance on
this line of cases, the proposed Rule 37(e) will likely accomplish its
goal of settling this dispute between the circuits.
2. Weaknesses. Despite the aforementioned improvements, the
Current Proposal is lacking in several important respects that will
prevent it from resolving the issues plaguing the civil-litigation
system. The most significant weakness is the Proposal’s continued
reliance on the common-law duty to preserve information in
197
anticipation or conduct of litigation. This decision could severely
undercut the Advisory Committee’s hopes of creating uniform
standards for Rule 37(e) sanctions, as it may perpetuate ambiguity
with respect to this critical threshold issue by allowing individual
courts to develop conflicting approaches to the duty to preserve ESI.
By failing to establish uniform preservation standards, the Advisory
Committee has missed an opportunity to address the problematic
uncertainty afflicting the early stages of the sanctions process.
As noted above, Duke Conference participants stressed the
importance of incentivizing cooperation between the parties as a
198
means of reducing costly and inefficient discovery disputes. Though
initial proposals contained provisions directing courts to consider
199
such cooperative efforts when ruling on a sanctions motion, the
Current Proposal seems to have scaled back its emphasis on
cooperation almost completely. For example, the Proposal includes a
provision that will amend Rule 1 to read “These rules should be
construed, administered, and employed by the court and the parties to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action

195. Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2002).
196. See 2014 Rules Memorandum, supra note 22, at Rules App. B-65 (“[Subdivision (e)(2)]
rejects cases such as Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Financial Corp., 306 F.3d 99 (2d
Cir. 2002), that authorize the giving of adverse-inference instructions on a finding of negligence
or gross negligence.”).
197. See id. at Rules App. B-59 (“The new rule applies only if the lost information should
have been preserved in the anticipation or conduct of litigation . . . .”).
198. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
199. See, e.g., 2013 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 134, at 153 (including as one of the Rule
37(e)(2) factors “whether the person who made [the discovery request] and the party engaged in
good-faith consultation about the scope of preservation”).
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200

and proceeding.” In its Committee Note, however, the Committee
explicitly provides that the Rule 1 amendment does not create a new
basis for sanctions and admits that “a rule amendment alone will not
201
produce reasonable and cooperative behavior among litigants.”
This language, coupled with the gradual elimination of provisions
encouraging cooperation from the Rule 37(e) proposal, suggests that
the Rule 1 amendment is largely aspirational. If interparty conduct
has no explicit bearing on the court’s ability to impose sanctions, it is
difficult to see how courts can effectively incentivize the degree of
cooperation envisioned by the Duke Conference contributors.
B. Recommendations for Revision and Effective Enforcement
1. Revision. The Current Proposal was approved by the Supreme
Court in April 2015 and is presently before Congress, which will
either reject the Proposal or allow it to take effect on December 1,
2015. If the Advisory Committee has the opportunity to revisit the
Current Proposal in the coming months, it would benefit from two
primary revisions to the existing text. First, the Committee should
scale back its explicit reliance on the common-law duty to preserve
and provide at least some specific guidelines for the courts on this
threshold issue. Second, it should reinstate the list of factors
promulgated in the initial proposals with some additional clarifying
language.
Although it may indeed be impractical to craft a comprehensive,
uniform duty to preserve ESI in the FRCP, the new Rule 37(e) would
benefit from some degree of guidance regarding the trigger and scope
of the threshold duty. As attorney Gregory P. Joseph—chair of the EDiscovery Panel at the Duke Conference—observes, “the nebulous
standard of common law . . . does not meaningfully inform the
202
prospective litigant whether or when the duty has been triggered.”
Though the filing of a complaint or a written production request
generally suffices as a trigger, the Current Proposal or its Committee
Note should include nonexclusive examples of events that do or,
perhaps more importantly, do not create a preservation obligation.
For example, as Joseph suggests, the Committee Note could provide
that actions such as “notifying an insurance company or indemnitor of

200. Id. at Rules App. B-13. The new text is in italics.
201. Id.
202. Joseph, supra note 51, at 8.
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potential liability” or “preparing an incident report or other steps
taken in the ordinary course of business in anticipation of litigation”
203
are sufficient to activate the preservation obligation. Furthermore,
the Advisory Committee should follow the advice of the E-Discovery
Panel and emphasize the importance of contractual duties in
204
triggering the preservation obligation. It may seem obvious that
contract provisions can create the duty, but the Advisory Committee
could encourage parties to contract more carefully for their
preservation obligations by highlighting the role of such provisions in
the Rule or the Committee Note.
Furthermore, the common-law duty is problematic because it
does not provide a clear scope of the preservation duty once it has
attached. The Advisory Committee should revise its proposal to
establish a baseline for the scope of the duty by specifying particular
types of data that must be preserved (for example, the email records
of named parties or top executives), leaving further requirements to
the court’s discretion or party agreement on a case-by-case basis.
District courts have previously held that, once triggered, the duty to
preserve automatically applies to the ESI belonging to key
205
employees. For example, in Cache La Poudre Feeds, LLC v. Land
206
O’Lakes, Inc. the court found that the defendant had violated its
duty to preserve ESI by failing to place a litigation hold on the hard
drives of “employees who played a significant or decision-making
207
role.” Courts may apply basic standards such as a “key employees”
provision through reliance on the common-law duty, but Rule 37(e)
would benefit from the addition of such examples on a nonexclusive
basis. Though this measure would not prevent all spoliation disputes,
it would at least provide a basic framework from which courts could
develop a more predictable common-law duty.
Next, the Advisory Committee should reincorporate the list of
208
relevant factors included in its initial proposals. Given the rapidly

203. Id. at 9.
204. See 2010 E-Discovery Panel Memorandum, supra note 21, at 5 (suggesting various
triggers including a “contractual duty to preserve”).
205. See, e.g., In re NTL, Inc. Sec. Litig., 244 F.R.D. 179, 194 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (granting an
adverse inference instruction and holding that “[r]elevant documents would include any e-mails
between the directors, officers, managers, and employees regarding the company’s financial
condition”).
206. Cache La Poudre Feeds, LLC v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 614 (D. Colo. 2007).
207. Id. at 629.
208. See supra Part II.A.4.
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changing nature of electronic-storage technology, it seems unwise to
discard this provision due to fears that litigants would mistakenly
believe it to be a comprehensive list of important factors. The
Advisory Committee could easily assuage these fears by simply
stating that this list is nonexclusive and intended to provide both
litigants and courts a helpful starting point in assessing preservation
conduct. The Advisory Committee would be especially well advised
to include a factor directing the court to consider the extent to which
the offending party has complied with district-specific e-discovery
guidelines and, more importantly, with any preservation standards
developed in cooperation with the opposing party. This factor could
incentivize proactive resolution of discovery disputes in two ways.
First, it would encourage district courts to develop comprehensive
case-management standards like those already in use in many districts
209
nationwide. Second, incorporating the theme of party cooperation
into discovery-sanctions criteria will remind parties that cooperating
early to establish discovery protocols can help insulate both sides
210
from sanctions if disputes do arise.
2. Enforcement. Should the proposed amendments package
come into effect as it stands, however, certain enforcement standards
would help courts achieve uniformity and encourage cost-effective,
efficient litigation. In the context of proposed Rule 37(e)(2), courts
should minimize their reliance on findings of bad faith or willfulness
in determining whether severe sanctions are appropriate. Spoliation
case law has shown that courts struggle to articulate clear criteria for
intent to withhold discoverable material (especially ESI), and as a
result they often conflate “good faith” analysis with the threshold
211
duty-to-preserve issue. As the Current Proposal already leaves the
duty-to-preserve question entirely in the hands of the trial court,
attempts to discern “bad faith” will risk a continuation of the
problems inherent in the current version of the Rule.
Instead of searching for evidence of bad-faith intent, courts
should take a proactive approach to Rule 37(e) and work with

209. See infra notes 216–219 and accompanying text.
210. See Joy Flowers Conti & Richard N. Lettieri, In re ESI Local Rules Enhance the Value
of Rule 26(f) “Meet and Confer,” 49 JUDGES’ J., no. 2, Spring 2010, at 29, 34 (“[W]hen a dispute
about ESI arises, it usually happens later in the litigation and is likely to be the result of a failure
of the parties to have adequate discussions early in the case about the costs and methods of ESI
preservation . . . .”).
211. See supra Part I.B.1.
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litigants to create case-specific ESI-preservation guidelines, treating
violations of these agreements as prima facie sanctionable conduct
and tailoring the sanctions to the degree of prejudice shown. Under
Rule 83, district courts may adopt local rules of practice that are not
duplicative or contrary to provisions of the FRCP or other federal
212
statutes. Since the 2006 e-discovery amendments, many districts
have developed ESI-specific guidelines with varying degrees of
213
detail. For example, the Delaware Default Standard, adopted in at
214
least three other districts, limits requesting parties to ten “focused”
electronic search terms, invokes cooperation as its guiding principle,
and states that the Default Standard shall apply only if “the parties
215
are unable to agree on the parameters and/or timing of discovery.”
In the absence of specific guidance from the FRCP, the district
courts should require parties to implement comprehensive case216
management plans like those already in use in several districts. For
example, the Northern District of California’s “Guidelines for the
Discovery of Electronically Stored Information” contains a thirtyfive-point ESI discovery checklist that instructs the parties to meet
and discuss topics such as “[t]he ranges of creation or receipt dates for
any ESI to be preserved” and “search method(s),” including specific
217
words or phrases . . . that will be used to identify discoverable ESI.”
Plans like these serve the dual purposes of resolving discovery
disputes as early as possible and encouraging party communication
and cooperation throughout the case. Similarly, district courts should
enlist the help of special masters with data-system expertise in the
construction of these plans, particularly in the more complex (and
212. FED. R. CIV. P. 83(a)(1).
213. For a survey of the local rules enacted after the 2006 amendments, see generally
Thomas Y. Allman, Local Rules, Standing Orders, and Model Protocols: Where the Rubber
Meets the (E-Discovery) Road, 19 RICH. J. L. & TECH. 8, 25–29 (2013).
214. See id. at 25 (noting that both the “Western District of Washington and the Northern
District of Illinois also incorporate adopted elements [from the Delaware Default Standard]”
(footnotes omitted)).
215. See D. DEL. DEFAULT STANDARD FOR DISCOVERY, INCLUDING DISCOVERY OF
ELECTRONICALLY STORED INFORMATION 1 (Dec. 8, 2011), http://www.ded.uscourts.gov/sites/
default/files/Chambers/SLR/Misc/EDiscov.pdf [http://perma.cc/X949-MS8V].
216. See, e.g., Standing Order, In re: Pilot Project Regarding Case Mgmt. Techniques for
Complex Civil Cases in the S. Dist. of N.Y., 11 Misc. 00388 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2011) (assigning
the case to a pilot case-management project reserved for specific categories of suits including
class actions and multidistrict ligation).
217. CHECKLIST FOR RULE 26(F) MEET AND CONFER REGARDING ELECTRONICALLY
STORED INFORMATION, U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE N. DIST. OF CAL. 1–2, http://www.cand.
uscourts.gov/filelibrary/1118/ESI_Checklist.pdf [http://perma.cc/MWG5-SAKK].
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correspondingly more expensive) cases. This approach should help
to control ESI-related costs throughout litigation. As Judge
Scheindlin notes, “[o]ne obvious advantage [to the use of special
masters] is that all parties share the cost of one expert, rather than the
219
duplicative costs associated with competing experts.” Some districts
already require or encourage parties to supply such experts. The
District of Kansas, for example, suggests that parties designate an ediscovery liaison who is “knowledgeable about the technical aspects
of e-discovery” and who “should be responsible for organizing each
220
party’s e-discovery efforts to insure consistency and thoroughness.”
Similarly, the Northern District of California’s e-discovery guidelines
provide that parties “shall designate an e-discovery liaison who
will . . . [b]e prepared to participate in e-discovery dispute resolution
221
to limit the need for Court intervention.” The regular use of ediscovery experts should, over time, result in more efficient ESI
dispute resolution and also relieve some pressure on judges, who
often have little familiarity with technologically advanced data222
storage systems.
When experienced litigants are involved, courts could also give
weight to prior preservation agreements between the parties and
allow previously negotiated preservation schemes to inform the scope
of the duty. For example, sophisticated parties might agree at the
outset of a business transaction that correspondence between certain
employees will be preserved even in the absence of foreseeable
litigation. For all such agreements and standing orders, the district
court should treat violations as prima facie sanctionable conduct so
that parties can confidently develop internal preservation protocols
that will minimize the risk of discovery sanctions. Although these
measures would not be sufficient to eliminate spoliation issues

218. On the increasingly common appointment of special masters in ESI-heavy cases, see
generally Scheindlin & Redgrave, supra note 62.
219. Id. at 376.
220. David J. Waxse, Advancing the Goals of a “Just, Speedy, and Inexpensive”
Determination of Every Action: The Recent Changes to the District of Kansas Guidelines for
Cases Involving Electronically Stored Information, 26 REGENT U. L. REV. 111, 123 (2014).
221. GUIDELINES FOR THE DISCOVERY OF ELECTRONICALLY STORED INFORMATION, U.S.
DIST. COURT FOR THE N. DIST. OF CAL. 3, http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/filelibrary/
1117/ESI_Guidelines.pdf [http://perma.cc/8RXX-8N2A].
222. For example, in a recent multidistrict pharmaceutical products-liability case, the Middle
District of Florida appointed a special master to oversee the technical details of ESI production
before any party alleged discovery misconduct or delay. See In re Seroquel Prods. Liab. Litig.,
244 F.R.D. 650, 65255 (M.D. Fla. 2007).
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entirely, they would encourage cooperative resolution of discovery
disputes and, over time, reduce the need to engage in costly
overpreservation.
CONCLUSION
If the history of the FRCP discovery rules tells us anything, it is
that the process of amending the rules is a tricky one. It often takes
years to appreciate the true effects of any one amendment, and the
astonishingly rapid rate of technological development in the last
quarter century has only made it more difficult for the Advisory
Committee to develop clear, effective guidelines. The Proposal
currently before Congress is, in several respects, a very strong effort;
it resolves several key sources of ambiguity while preserving the trial
court’s ability to adjust its sanctions doctrine as the discovery
landscape continues to change. Unfortunately, however, the Current
Proposal reflects a problematic focus on the court’s role in fixing the
issues facing the civil-litigation system, and it is difficult to see the
Proposal as a significant improvement on the existing Rule. Until the
Advisory Committee proposes amendments that more effectively
incentivize party cooperation throughout the pretrial process, litigants
will continue to experience the costs, delays, and abusive discovery
practices that have persisted since the advent of the FRCP.

